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Predicting the Diversity of Foreign Entry Modes  
Abstract 
This paper expands entry mode literature by referring to multiple modes exerted in 
different value chain activities within and across host markets, rather than to a single 
entry mode at the host market level. Scale of operations and knowledge intensity are 
argued to affect firms’ entry mode diversity across value chain activities and host 
markets. Analyzing a sample of Israeli based firms we show that larger firms exhibit a 
higher degree of entry mode diversity both across value chain activities and across 
host markets. Higher levels of knowledge intensity are also associated with more 
diversity in firms’ entry modes across both dimensions.  
 
 
Key Words: entry mode, diversity, value chain activities, firm size, knowledge 
intesity.  
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Predicting the Diversity of Foreign Entry Modes 
 
Introduction 
Firms’ foreign market entry mode choice is one of the most researched topics in 
international business (e.g. Anand & Delios, 1997; Datta, Herrmann & Rasheed, 
2002; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Malhotra, Agarwal & Ulgado., 2003; Madhok, 1997; 
Martin & Salomon, 2003; Melin, 1992; Pedersen et al., 2002)1. Yet, despite the 
considerable attention devoted to this topic, the conceptualization of “entry modes” 
remains, by and large, a single dimensional construct referring to a specific mode 
exerted by a firm in a given foreign market - be it exports, licensing, joint ventures, 
wholly owned greenfield or acquired subsidiaries and so forth. This highly simplified 
view of entry modes, while convenient and useful for theory building, stands in stark 
contrast to the complexity of entry modes that can be observed in real-world firms. 
For instance, let us examine the entry modes of Gilat Satellite Networks as they 
appeared in 1999. Gilat is an Israeli based provider of end-to-end telecommunications 
and data networking solutions via satellite. In the United States Gilat’s R&D and 
production operations were conducted both via greenfield and acquired wholly owned 
subsidiaries. Distribution and customer support to the American market, on the other 
hand, were simultaneously provided through local independent distributors, a sales 
office, a strategic alliance and a joint venture. Interestingly, identical entry modes for 
R&D, production, distribution and customer support were used by Gilat in the 
European Union. On the other hand, for its operations is South and Central America, 
Gilat used acquired R&D operations, acquired production operations in parallel to a 
                                                 
1 While the term "entry mode" seems to refer to the starting of operations in a foreign market, 
traditionally it is also used when describing the long term operations of a firm in a foreign market, 
regardless of its timing. In what follows we therefore adopt this notion and use the term "entry mode" 
to portray the variety of long term foreign operation modes.    
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joint venture manufacturing facility and provided distribution and customer support 
through agents, strategic alliances and acquired wholly owned subsidiaries. Finally, in 
South East Asia Gilat only had joint venture production operations and strategic 
alliances for distribution and customer support. Hence, considering the global 
operations of Gilat, we note that the firm had two different entry modes for R&D, 
three different entry modes for production, and five different entry modes for 
distribution and customer support. Considering Gilat's operations on a per-region 
basis, the firm had six different entry modes in both the United States and the 
European Union, four different entry modes in South and Central America and two 
different entry modes in South East Asia.  
The brief example of Gilat demonstrates the major weakness of extant literature 
on entry mode choice. Since value chain activities differ substantially in their scale 
and scope economics, resource requirements, asset specificity and strategic 
importance (Porter, 1985) firms may have different entry modes for different value 
chain activities and hence multiple entry modes per host market. Moreover, even 
when the same value chain activity is considered institutional and cultural differences 
between countries (Delios & Henisz, 2003) are expected to lead to diversity in the 
inter-country entry modes chosen for a given value chain activity. It is highly unlikely 
that the managerial decisions on such entry modes are independent (take for instance 
the decision of which value chain activities to outsource and which to conduct in-
house, Quinn & Hilmer, 1994) and thus the usefulness of analyzing a specific entry 
mode at the firm-country level, without referring to that firm's overall configuration of 
entry mode is quite limited (Buckley & Hashai, 2004, 2005; Hill, Hwang & Kim, 
1990; Petersen, Benito, Welch, & Asmussen, 2007). It is therefore questionable 
whether extant entry mode research has dealt with the full complexity of firms' 
 4
  
 
foreign market entry mode choices and whether the economic factors shaping such 
choices have been fully unraveled.  
The aim of this paper is to expand foreign market entry mode research by 
switching the unit of analysis from country specific entry mode to the analysis of    
multiple, rather than alternative, entry modes of a firm across its value chain and 
across foreign markets. By adopting this point of view, we are able to examine and 
compare the portfolios of entry modes used by different firms and determine the 
factors that affect the level of diversity of entry modes across the value chain and 
across host markets. We offer tentative answers to the question of why some firms use 
complex combinations of diverse entry modes while others follow a standardized 
approach applying only one or a few modes. More specifically, the paper explores the 
factors that shape the levels of diversity in firms’ entry modes by examining the 
impact of two distinctive variables - scale of operations and knowledge intensity - on 
entry mode diversity.   
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we review different 
strands of literature and justify the need for considering scale of operations and 
knowledge intensity as potentially important determinants of firms’ entry mode 
diversity. We then conceptualize entry mode diversity according to different levels of 
analysis (area level, business activity level, and corporate level) and derive 
hypotheses as to how scale of operations and knowledge intensity affect entry mode 
diversity at these three levels. The hypotheses derived from our conceptual framework 
are tested on data of entry modes used by a sample of Israeli based firms. This is 
followed by an analysis of the results and finally we discus our results, suggest further 
research avenues and conclude. 
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Determinants of Entry Mode Diversity – A Literature Review 
Extant literature on foreign market entry modes has its offspring in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) theory which explains the existence and growth of 
multinational enterprises (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981, 
Teece, 1986a). Based on internalization and transaction cost economics explanations, 
this stream of literature was primarily focusing on the impact of failures in the market 
for firm specific know-how (most often referring to technological know-how) on 
firms' choice between licensing and wholly owned production subsidiaries. Over time, 
several intermediate arrangements such as equity and non-equity based alliances came 
to the forefront (Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Hennart, 1988a, 1988b, 1991) and 
comprehensive models to predict the choice between licensing arrangements and 
production subsidiaries, between joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries, or 
between exports and foreign production were developed (e.g. Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986; Dunning, 2001; Hennart, 1988a, 1988b; Hill, et al., 1990; Hirsch, 1976; Teece, 
1986a). Drawing on market imperfection explanations, the political and economic 
institutional characteristics of foreign locations (Brouthers, 2002; Delios & Henisz, 
2003), the resource-based view of the firm (Anand & Delios, 1997; Madhok, 1997) 
and the knowledge-based view of the firm (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Martin & 
Salomon, 2003), our understanding and predictive ability of entry modes decisions 
was significantly enriched.   
Nevertheless, most of the aforementioned studies considered the firm as a 
“black box” and were (either explicitly or implicitly) motivated in explaining the 
existence or non-existence of international production (Dunning, 2001). Even when 
value chain activities other than production were introduced, a comprehensive view of 
multiple entry modes across the value chain or across different host markets was 
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rarely taken.  Marketing scholars interested in marketing channels integration have 
contrasted sales subsidiaries with local distributors and franchised outlets with 
company-owned ones (e.g. Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; Fladmoe-Lindquist & 
Jacque, 1995; Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990). Supply chain management scholars have 
contrasted in-house logistics with local, independent suppliers (Levy, 1997) and so 
forth. Scholars have typically not, however, looked at the value chain to its full extent 
in terms of the organization of entry modes.  
In fact, market failure is not limited to the market for know-how but may relate 
to the markets for manufacturing, distribution, services, and to other markets. 
Likewise, resource- and knowledge-based explanations of entry modes as well as 
institutional arguments may naturally affect the whole value chain of 
internationalizing firms and may do so differently in various host markets. 
Furthermore, even within a given foreign market, firms often do not stick to one 
particular entry mode, but instead simultaneously employ a variety of entry modes at 
the value chain activity level (Benito & Welch, 1994; Fina & Rugman, 1996; Petersen 
& Welch, 2002). We should therefore refer to a firm's entry mode decision not as a 
general decision at the firm-country level but rather as a per country and per value 
activity specific decision (Buckley & Casson, 1998; Buckley & Hashai, 2004, 2005; 
Casson, 2000). Our earlier example of Gilat Satellite Networks demonstrates both of 
these points of view nicely as Gilat simultaneously combine different entry modes 
across and within value chain activities as well as across and within host markets. 
Taken together, it is therefore implied that firms may often pursue a "portfolio" or 
"configuration" of entry modes constituting a much more complex structural 
arrangement of entry modes than that reflected by extant foreign market entry mode 
research.  
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Foreign market entry mode scholars have given a particular emphasis to the 
examination of the need for control over foreign value chain activities, usually 
measured as the degree of equity ownership in a foreign operation. This line of 
research basically emerged as studies of FDI examined make-or-buy choices in an 
international setting. The dependent variables have thus either been: (a) dichotomous, 
i.e. make-or-buy choices, such as wholly-owned subsidiary versus licensing, (b) 
multiple ordinal categories, e.g. wholly-owned subsidiary versus partly-owned 
subsidiary (equity joint venture) versus licensing, or (c) some measure of the focal 
actor’s degree of ownership in a foreign venture (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Zhao, 
Luo & Suh, 2004). Yet again, all these measures ignore potentially different control 
requirements corresponding to different value chain activities located in multiple host 
countries.  
Gauging the diversity of a firm’s entry mode configuration highlights the 
managerial complexity of handling different entry modes at a given foreign market as 
well as different entry modes across such markets. Since firms are often considered to 
be heterogeneous (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) it is reasonable to expect firms to 
differ in terms of entry mode diversity. Hence, it follows that compelling explanations 
of what accounts for inter-firm differences in entry mode diversity should be offered. 
Among other variables, scale of operations and knowledge intensity are 
traditionally emphasized as two distinctive variables affecting foreign market entry 
mode choice (Anand & Delios, 1997; Benito, 1996; Buckley & Pearce, 1979; Datta et 
al., 2002; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Kogut & Singh, 1988; 
Tan et al., 2001). Scale of operations plays an important role in a firm's decision 
whether to export, license or open a foreign production facility (Agarwal & 
Ramaswami, 1992; Aliber, 1970; Buckley & Casson, 1981; Buckley & Pearce, 1979). 
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This is mainly due to the relationship between the scale of a firm's operations and 
relative fixed and variable costs. Ownership based operation modes typically require 
up-front investment, which implies high fixed costs, combined with low variable 
costs. By contrast, externalization appears to be associated with a combination of high 
variable and low fixed costs. Thus, other things being equal, cost minimization 
considerations are expected to lead smaller firms (e.g. in terms of their sales volume) 
to favor externalization and larger firms to favour a higher degree of ownership of 
value chain activities.  
Knowledge intensity is often conceived as the single most important 
determinant of a firm's foreign operation mode (e.g. Buckley & Casson, 1976; 
Buckley & Hashai, 2004, 2005; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Kumar, 1987; Martin & 
Salomon, 2003). Knowledge intensity is reflected by the share of proprietary firm 
specific knowledge contained in each unit of output. The firm-specific nature of 
knowledge implies that higher levels of knowledge intensity are expected to be 
associated with higher complexity in the interpretation and transfer of such 
knowledge (Scuricini, 1988). The more complex a firm's knowledge base, the more 
costly is knowledge transfer both between value chain activities (Kogut & Zander, 
1992, 1993; Martin & Salomon, 2003) and between the firm and its customers 
(Hirsch, 1989; Simonin, 1999) due to the fact that complex knowledge is often 
expected to be less codifiable and less teachable (Kogut & Zander, 1993). Since 
organizational bonds are expected to significantly reduce the cost of such knowledge 
transfer (Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1993; Martin & Salomon, 2003) it follows that 
higher knowledge intensity is expected to be associated with greater degree of 
ownership.  
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The level of knowledge intensity is also concomitant with high uncertainty 
which increases market transaction costs as the costs of monitoring, enforcing and 
regulating inter-firm contractual arrangements increase. These transaction costs imply 
that knowledge-intensive firms usually prefer internalization of their operations 
(Contractor, 1990; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Williamson, 
1975). On the other hand, high knowledge intensity impels incumbents to source 
knowledge outside their firm boundaries as it becomes extremely difficult for the 
individual firm to maintain competitiveness for all its value chain activities when 
performed as in-house business activities (Teece, 1986b; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). 
As scale of operations and knowledge intensity thus influence the entry mode 
decision, it is likely that the diversity of the firm’s entry mode portfolio across 
countries and value activities is affected by these two variables as well. Therefore, 
building on the constructs of operational scale and knowledge intensity we next seek 
to explain how the diversity of firms’ entry mode configurations is determined. 
However, before doing so we formally define the concept of entry mode diversity and 
its resulting aggregation levels.   
 
Conceptualizing Entry Mode Diversity 
 The entry mode diversity of a given firm can be conceptualized and 
operationalized by looking at a matrix of the entry modes used by that firm (Petersen 
et al., 2007). Assume that an international firm operates in I host markets and has J 
identifiable activities in its value chain. Formally, the entry mode matrix of this firm 
at a given point in time is then defined as the matrix M=(mij), where i=1...I indexes 
host markets and j=1...J indexes value chain activities. Each cell in the matrix 
indicates under which entry mode (denoted as mij) the given activity is performed in 
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the given host market. The general form of the entry mode matrix is presented in 
Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The entry mode matrix implies that there are three levels of aggregation in 
which we can discuss entry mode diversity2:  
• Area level diversity refers to different entry modes exerted by a firm across its 
value chain in a given foreign area – country or region – and therefore can be 
represented as a row vector ( )iJiii mmmm ,,, 11 K≡•  of value activity-level 
decisions. For example, with six different entry modes, Gilat has high area 
diversity both in the United States and in the European Union. 
• Business activity level diversity is about how a specific value chain activity is 
performed in different geographical areas (countries or regions), as measured 
by each column in the matrix. Business activity diversity for a given activity 
is therefore represented by a column vector of the form 
( )Ijjjj mmmm ,,, 21 K≡• . With five different entry modes Gilat has high 
business activity diversity in distribution and customer support across 
countries and regions. 
• Corporate level diversity represents the variety of entry modes in each cell of 
the entire matrix M. Designing this matrix encompasses all area-level and 
business activity level decisions.  
 
The entry mode diversity matrix is reminiscent of Porter's (1986) global activity 
configuration grid. However, where Porter's grid refers only to the location of value 
chain activities, this matrix goes one step further to include the entry mode chosen for 
                                                 
2 It is noteworthy that more than a single entry mode may apply to a specific value chain activity in a 
host market, hence duplicable value chain activity can be included as the matrix columns.   
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each value chain activity as well. The main contribution of the matrix is that it 
explicitly incorporates a value chain distinction over multiple host countries and 
regions into traditional foreign entry mode taxonomies, resulting in a broader unit of 
analysis than that taken in extant entry mode literature (Datta et al., 2002).  
   
Entry mode diversity and scale of operation 
We take a cost-benefit approach to predict the entry mode diversity used by 
firms. Entry mode diversity can potentially affect both the firm’s costs, 
conceptualized as the sum of its production and transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 
1985), and its revenue-enhancing assets. Our theoretical framework therefore 
incorporates these effects. The benefits of high diversity are derived per value chain 
activity and per host market heterogeneity in terms of economies of specialization. 
With high entry mode diversity, firms can optimize the operation of each individual 
value chain activity in each host market, obtaining a better overall fit with a 
heterogeneous set of specific foreign market conditions and/or activity-specific 
considerations. An important feature of these benefits is that they are contingent upon 
the scale of operations (e.g. sales volume, see Stigler, 1958; Williamson, 1967). For 
instance, if indigenous partners in a foreign market can provide certain components at 
a cost which is x% below the internal unit costs of a focal firm, selective outsourcing 
of the relevant manufacturing processes will save that firm x×V/100, where V is the 
activity volume in this market. In a similar vein, if a potential R&D or marketing 
partner with some specific competencies (such as reputation or special familiarity 
with customer preferences) enables the firm to charge a x% premium over its price, 
partnering will add x×V/100 to the firm’s revenue. In both cases, the higher the sales, 
the higher the absolute contribution of a specific foreign market entry mode chosen.   
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Moreover, indivisibility of assets and activities such as people, equipment or 
land (Penrose, 1959) makes a small scale firm more limited in its ability to split up its 
value chain into diversified entry modes. Take the extreme case of a one-man firm. 
Such a firm would naturally find it difficult to separate the economics of each value 
chain activity and outsource those that are least efficiently done in-house. A large 
firm, on the other hand, has more degrees of freedom to do so. Insufficient scale 
economies and asset indivisibility are expected to constrain small sized firms in their 
ability to differentiate their foreign operations in different host markets and either 
concentrate such activities in a limited number of locations (e.g. hold a single 
production plant worldwide) or combine various host markets under a limited number 
of entry modes (e.g. use the same agent for distribution in different regions). Hence, 
we suggest that the larger a firm, the higher the marginal benefits of entry mode 
diversity. 
The costs of diversity are mainly the costs of searching for potential acquirees, 
partners, or suppliers of each value chain activity in each host market, soliciting 
offers, measuring and forecasting performance, and writing contracts (Buckley & 
Casson, 1976; Hart, 1988, 1995; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Even in cases where all 
necessary information is easily obtained the interdependencies between value chain 
activities (Buckley & Hashai, 2004, 2005) would make it difficult to configure and 
manage the entire value chain optimally. The number of options that a given firm's 
management has to choose between, and hence the cognitive costs incurred by the 
firm, rises exponentially with the number of value chain activities and host markets3. 
This implies that the more diverse the different entry mode configurations the more 
complex it is to manage them. Learning economies should decrease the costs of 
                                                 
3 Even under the conservative assumption of a single entry mode per value chain activity, for j value 
chain activities, i host markets and k potential entry modes for each activity, there are ki×j potential 
corporate level entry mode configurations. 
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managing low entry mode diversity since mangers can leverage their experience in 
managing a specific entry mode over multiple value chain activities and/or host 
markets. On the other hand, coordination costs as well as the transfer of knowledge 
between different partners engaged in different governance modes as well as between 
multiple intra-firm governance modes (e.g. greenfield and acquired operations) are 
expected to sharply rise with entry mode diversity. The main point is that both the 
transaction costs involved in engaging in multiple entry modes and the costs arising 
from the complexity of managing multiple highly diverse entry mode configurations 
are, by and large, fixed costs which do not increase linearly with activity volume to 
the same extent as the benefits from diversity do. In other words, there are economies 
of scale in search, contracting, coordination and deliberation processes. 
Taken together, this suggests that the benefits of diversity are positively related 
to activity volume whereas the costs of diversity are not. These costs increase with the 
number of value chain activities considered, the number of host markets and the 
number of per value chain activity entry modes, rather than with the scale of 
operations. Figure 2 shows the marginal benefits (MB) for a low-volume and a high-
volume firm, and their common marginal cost schedule (MC) 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
All else being equal, large firms enjoy higher marginal benefits and hence their 
optimal levels of diversity, D1 (where the MB curve intercepts the MC curve), are 
larger than those of small firms (D0). This suggests that observed diversity should be 
positively related to activity volume. We therefore hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Scale of operations positively affects entry mode diversity.  
 
Knowledge intensity and entry mode diversity 
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Another central firm characteristic that affects the costs of entry mode diversity is 
knowledge intensity. As noted earlier the cost of knowledge flows between and within 
value chain activities (Buckley & Hashai, 2004; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Martin & 
Salomon, 2003) are expected to be substantially higher for firms with high knowledge 
intensity than for firms with low knowledge intensity as higher knowledge intensity 
often implies higher complexity of coding and decoding the transferred knowledge. 
Higher diversity implies that such knowledge flows are conducted between different 
entry modes pursued by a focal firm. Higher diversity is therefore likely to result in 
greater costs of transferring complex knowledge, since it requires tight coordination 
of knowledge transfer between multiple partners engaging in different contractual 
arrangements as well as between those and multiple intra-firm entry modes.  
Coupled with the transaction costs that are implied from the high uncertainty of 
running a highly knowledge intensive firm (Contractor, 1990; Kim & Hwang, 1990; 
Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Williamson, 1975) this means that more transaction and 
deliberation costs must be incurred for firms with high knowledge intensity than for 
firms with low knowledge intensity when engaging in high entry mode diversity. This 
is illustrated in Figure 3, where high knowledge intensity increases the marginal costs 
of diversity. Seen in isolation this increase would lead to a decrease in the optimal 
level of diversity, from D0 to D1. 
[Insert Figure 3 About Here] 
On the other hand, the benefits of diversity may also be affected by knowledge 
intensity. When value chain activities are subject to increasing complexity and require 
more and more human capital input the likelihood that these activities can be 
performed competitively within the boundaries of the individual firm is diminishing 
(Teece, 1986b; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). In other words, the conduct of sophisticated 
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value chain activities compels knowledge-intensive firms to source multiple other 
firms' specific knowledge and combine it with internally developed capabilities.. 
Hence, specialized, highly knowledge-intensive firms are required to engage in a 
heterogeneous portfolio of agreements to obtain various complementary assets. 
Engaging in multiple agreements with multiple partners translates into entry mode 
diversity rather than into relying on a narrow set of entry modes. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the relational-view of the firms (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Kale, Dyer & Singh, 2002; Lavie, 2006) that essentially implies that combining 
complementary capabilities of different firms may lead to sustainable competitive 
advantage.  
In other words, at low levels of knowledge intensity firms are more likely to 
build on a relatively small number of entry modes per host market and per value chain 
activity, however as knowledge intensity increases, the level of sophistication 
required at each market and for each activity increases. At the value chain activity 
level increased entry mode diversity might be the result of the fact that at high 
knowledge intensity there are more diverse and more complex tasks to perform while 
at the host market level increased entry mode diversity mat result from heterogeneity 
in firms competences that require entrants to use multiple modes with different 
partners for R&D, production, distribution and servicing. 
More generally, the firm’s choice of entry modes constitutes its organizational 
interface with different host country environments and thereby also determines which 
host country resources it can access. It follows from this that a diverse set of entry 
modes would allow for sourcing from a diverse pool of knowledge and resources, 
which may be particularly beneficial for knowledge-intensive firms. This suggests 
that the benefits of diversity, including sourcing of complementary resources through 
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a heterogeneous set of organizational arrangements, are higher for knowledge 
intensive firms than for other firms. This is illustrated via the shifting marginal benefit 
curve in Figure 4 which, all else being equal, results in a higher optimal level of 
diversity at D'1 than in D'0.  
[Insert Figure 4 About Here] 
Taken together, the cost and benefit arguments illustrate that the relationship 
between knowledge intensity and diversity could potentially be either positive or 
negative, depending on how sensitive the costs and benefits of diversity are to 
knowledge intensity. A priori there is no reason to believe that one effect should be 
stronger or weaker than the other and it is thus ultimately an empirical question. 
Therefore we suggest the following competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Knowledge intensity negatively affects entry mode diversity. 
Hypothesis 2b: Knowledge intensity positively affects entry mode diversity. 
 
Data and methods 
Our hypotheses were tested on data obtained from Israel’s largest publicly 
traded industrial firms. The original list included Israel’s one hundred and fifty largest 
industrial firms, which exported at least 25% of their sales. Combined exports by 
these 150 firms represented about 80 percent of Israel’s industrial exports in 1999. 
The list was based on data received from Israel’s Ministry of Industry and Trade and 
data provided by Dun & Bradstreet (2000). After eliminating foreign affiliates, 
conglomerates and firms which were not publicly traded we were left with a sample 
of 101 firms. To obtain a balanced panel we further eliminated all firms with missing 
data for any variable for either of the years of 1995 and 1999. Hence, the final sample 
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consisted of 67 firms that provided useable information, including questionnaire data4. 
Comparisons between the 67 participating firms and the 34 non-participating firms 
did not show evidence of any response bias in terms of firm sales, number of 
employees, age, industrial classification and percentage of foreign sales.  
For the purpose of the current study we have obtained the following 
information from the questionnaires. First, we needed to construct measures for entry 
mode diversity. Each firm in the sample has reported its foreign market entry modes 
in the years 1995 and 1999 for four major value chain activities (R&D, production, 
distribution and customer support) and for six major regions (United States, European 
Union, Rest of America, Rest of Europe, South East Asia and Rest of the World). 
Since data collection of per country and per value chain activity entry modes is 
extremely complex we decided to focus on region-specific entry modes at the value 
chain activity level. This approach is quite common in extant literature (e.g. Almor et 
al, 2006; Kim et al, 1993; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Yeung, Poon & Perry, 2001) 
and reflects the tendency of firms to configure their operations at a regional, rather 
than a country level. Such an approach is especially feasible for small and medium-
sized firms which are resource constrained. As shown later, this firm size 
characteristic fits our sample well. 
For each value chain activity and each region one or more of the following 
entry modes could be assigned:  
1. Export by means of an agent/ distributor 
2. Export by means of a wholly owned sales office in country of destination 
3. Strategic alliance with a local company 
4. Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
                                                 
4 Data was obtained from the financial statements of the firms and through structured interviews with 
CEO and VP level executives.   
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5. International joint venture 
6. A wholly owned greenfield subsidiary 
7. A wholly owned acquired subsidiary 
Dependent variables  
Following the aggregation levels of diversity suggested in the conceptual 
framework section we defined three measures of entry mode diversity, which were 
calculated for each of the years 1995 and 1999. Area diversity describes the variation 
in entry modes across business activities (value chain activities) within a given 
location. For each area (region) i, we measured the number of entry modes used 
throughout the value chain. These area-level numbers were then averaged to arrive at 
the firm’s overall area diversity. Business activity diversity describes a firm's tendency 
to vary its entry modes of a specific value chain activity across locations (regions). 
For each value chain activity j, we measured the number of entry modes used 
worldwide. The two variables – area and business activity diversity – capture 
variations along the two dimensions of the entry mode diversity matrix (cf. Figure 1). 
For example, a firm which always uses joint ventures for production and always 
wholly-owned subsidiaries for R&D would have a higher degree of area diversity than 
of business activity diversity as it does not adapt its governance form to individual 
locations. Conversely, a firm using wholly-owned subsidiaries for all activities in 
Europe and joint ventures for all activities in Asia would have a higher degree of 
business activity diversity than of area diversity as it does not distinguish between 
different value chain activities in its governance forms. Finally, corporate diversity is 
the number of different entry modes found in the entire entry mode diversity matrix of 
the firm. This captures variations along both the area and business activity 
dimensions. 
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Independent Variables 
Our independent variables included were: (1) Scale of operations – measured 
as firm size in terms of total revenues (in US$) in a given year; and (2) Knowledge 
intensity – measured as the ratio of R&D outlays to sales in a given year. As both 
variables were heavily skewed to the left, we performed logarithmic transformations 
on them, bringing skewness values down from above 3 to within ±0.5. In order to 
alleviate multicollinearity problems when including the interaction term, the two 
variables were also centered so as to have a mean of zero.  
In addition we used several control variables. Firm year of establishment was 
used to control for the impact of accumulated managerial experience on entry mode 
diversity. Industry dummies were also used to control for industry specific effects 
(such as: per industry regulation, industry specific transaction costs, industrial 
organization) on entry mode choice and hence on entry mode diversity.  Since our 
sample did not include conglomerates, we could classify the firms in our sample into 
the following industries: (1) chemicals; (2) food & beverage; (3) metal; (4) rubber, 
plastic, wood & paper; (5) textile & clothing; (6) electronics and computer hardware; 
(7) software; (8) telecommunication; (9) pharmaceuticals and (10) other. After 
controlling for other effects five of these industries were identified as having 
relatively more diversified entry modes than other industries: Rubber and plastic, 
textile and clothing, electronics and computer hardware, telecommunications and 
metal. Industry dummies for these five industries were therefore used as control 
variables. Furthermore, we controlled for the scope of foreign operations, defined as 
the number of cells (region-business activity combinations) in the entry mode matrix 
occupied by the firm. All else being equal, firms with operations in many locations, 
performing many value chain activities, can have higher diversity between those 
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operations than can firms with only a limited scope of international activity. Finally, 
as a robustness check, we included the interaction term of knowledge intensity and 
size in our model. This enables us to check whether the impact of firm size is valid for 
all levels of knowledge intensity, and vice versa. 
Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics and correlations of our sample. The 
mean establishment year of the firms in the sample was 1975. The average sales 
revenue was 128,012 ($ US thousands), and R&D expenditures constituted 12% of 
revenue. This implies that the firms in our sample are typically small- to medium- 
sized and that many of them can be considered as knowledge-intensive. These firms 
have a relatively higher level of business activity diversity than of area diversity. 
There are high correlations between the three measures of diversity, while no specific 
correlations were identified between the independent variables except between firm 
size and scope of foreign operations.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We used panel data models to analyze our sample. Panel data models allow 
estimation of cross-sectional (firm) effects, time effects, or both. Initially we 
estimated all three types of models to evaluate the importance of each of these two 
dimensions. The two-way models with both time and firm effects were almost 
identical to the one-way cross-sectional models, and the time effect was insignificant 
for all dependent variables except corporate diversity, where it was only significant at 
the p=0.05 level. Therefore, we concluded that incorporating time-varying intercepts 
or errors would not justify the resulting decline in parsimony and degrees of freedom, 
and we proceeded to estimate a series of one-way models with only firm-specific 
effects. 
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For each of the three dependent variables we developed three models: a pooled 
OLS regression, a fixed effects model allowing for firm-specific intercepts, and a 
random effects model treating the error term as firm-specific. Each of these models is 
reported both with and without the control variables, i.e. scope of foreign operations, 
industry, and firm year of establishment. Note that the traditional fixed effects 
estimator does not allow time-invariant control variables (industry and firm year of 
establishment) since these are perfectly collinear with the firm dummies. Hence, to 
include these variables in the fixed effects model, we used the unit effect vector 
decomposition technique developed by Plumper and Troeger (2004). In this approach 
the estimated firm-specific intercepts are regressed on the time-invariant variables and 
the residual from this regression is used as a predictor in a pooled OLS regression 
along with the time-varying and time-invariant variables. This effectively decomposes 
the firm-specific fixed effect into two orthogonal components: one which is explained 
by the time-invariant variables – in our case, an industry-specific and age-related 
component – and a residual component of firm effects not explained by these 
variables (and hence caused by other, unobserved variables). While it produces the 
same R square, the technique is more efficient than the fixed effect model, especially 
if the time-varying independent variables are “almost time-invariant” and if the 
sample is small (as in our case). It has also been shown in Monte Carlo simulations to 
outperform the pooled OLS, random effects, and Hausman-Taylor instrumental 
variables approaches in terms of consistency and unbiasedness (Plumper and Troeger, 
2004). 
Results 
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The results of our panel data models regressions are presented in Tables 2-4. 
For each model we present the regression results with and without the control 
variables. 
[Insert Tables 2-4 about here] 
For all dependent variables, adding the fixed firm-specific effects to the 
pooled OLS regression increases the variance explained from about 20% to more than 
80%. The F-test confirms that these group effects are significant, which implies that 
the pooled OLS regression without group effects may be biased. The pooled OLS 
regression is also rejected by the significance of the LM statistic, which in all cases 
favors the random effects model (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). 
For all three diversity measures, the Hausman m-value is insignificant, 
implying that the estimates produced by the fixed and random effects models are 
similar and that the random effects model is not biased (Hausman, 1978). A casual 
comparison of the coefficients confirms this. The somewhat lower significance for the 
fixed effects coefficients can be attributed to the lower efficiency of this model and 
the large share of variance captured by the firm dummies, which reflects the general 
advantage of using a random effects specification in small samples. Alternatively, the 
vector decomposition model (model 4 in all three tables) is similar to the fixed effects 
model but more efficient. The results of all the diversity models are generally robust 
to different model specifications. Variance inflation factors are reported for model 4, 
and as they are all quite low (much lower than the recommended threshold of 10), 
multicollinearity can be assumed not to significantly bias the results (Neter, 
Wasserman  & Kutner, 1990). 
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Overall, the results of all the models presented in Tables 2-4 indicate that there 
is a positive correlation between scale (measured by firm size) and entry mode 
diversity thus confirming hypothesis 1. The results also indicate that knowledge 
intensity is positively related to entry mode diversity. Hence, hypothesis 2a is rejected 
in favour of a positive relationship between knowledge intensity and diversity as 
predicted by our competing hypothesis 2b. As for the control variables, firm age (the 
opposite of year of establishment which is used as the independent variable) is 
negatively correlated to spatial entry mode diversity. The industry effects were found 
to be different in the three models, and the scope of foreign operations was positively 
related to diversity. The interaction of scale of operations and knowledge intensity did 
not have a significant effect on any of the three diversity types analyzed, confirming 
that the two variables are independent and not interactive determinants of foreign 
entry mode diversity. 
Discussion  
Our analysis of area level, business activity level and corporate level entry 
mode diversity reveals several interesting findings. First, we were able to support the 
hypotheses that there are economies of scale in entry mode diversity, resulting in 
relatively higher benefits (cost savings or value creation) than costs as scale increases. 
This result was consistent across all our diversity measures and indicates that larger 
firms benefit more than small ones from having diverse entry modes across host 
markets and value chain activities.  
A more interesting finding, however, is the positive relationship found 
between knowledge intensity and entry mode diversity. The finding that firms of high 
knowledge intensity pursue more diverse entry modes is by no means a trivial one in a 
theoretical perspective as a cost-benefit argument provided indications for both a 
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positive and a negative effect of knowledge intensity on entry mode diversity. 
Consequently, we developed competing sets of hypotheses. Our results indicate that 
the need for complementary assets and capabilities residing with several firms 
overrule transaction cost and knowledge transfer cost effects. Hence, firms operating 
in knowledge-intensive industries combine multiple agreements with other firms and 
internally developed capabilities – despite the transaction costs involved in such a 
diverse set of organizational arrangements.  
The high correlations among our dependent variables indicate that the three 
diversity types are strongly related, and the empirical analysis shows that they are 
more or less determined by the same organizational characteristics. As a scale, the 
three items have Cronbach's Alpha of 0.89 and they all load on the same factor in a 
post-hoc confirmatory factor analysis. This could indicate that entry mode diversity is 
indeed a firm-level construct. On the other hand, our data also reveals slight but 
interesting differences between the different dimensions of diversity. For example, 
high diversity can be expected to occur more frequently within specific locations 
(countries and regions) than within specific business activities across locations. This 
finding indicates that cross-national/regional differences (culture, language, laws and 
regulations etc.) have a considerable impact on choice of entry mode, and thereby on 
entry mode diversity. Also, the finding that age is negatively correlated with entry 
mode diversity on area level indicates that younger firms have more diversified entry 
modes within particular locations. This may imply that in their early years in a certain 
foreign market, firms experiment with all sorts of entry modes, but that after a period 
of trial and error a relatively narrower set of the most efficient entry modes is chosen 
within that specific location. Interestingly, such an entry mode diversity effect is 
absent at the business activity level and corporate diversity level, implying that across 
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areas entry mode diversity is maintained regardless of age. This may reflect the 
perseverance of country differences and the increase in local embeddedness over time, 
making it difficult for firms to standardize their entry modes across borders once these 
are well established.             
There are several avenues for future research on entry mode diversity. First of 
all, more research is required in order to analyze the impact of additional factors on 
entry mode diversity. Moreover, while scale of operations and knowledge intensity 
were found to be significant in explaining entry mode diversity, it might still be that 
after a certain threshold of scale and knowledge intensity transaction costs reduce the 
benefits of increased diversity. Thus, similar studies relating to larger firms and to 
firms with a more diverse range of knowledge intensity may help us to strengthen the 
external validity of the linkage between operational scale, knowledge intensity and 
entry mode diversity. Exploring the dynamics in entry mode diversity (Petersen & 
Welch, 2002) is yet another potentially important line of research, as understanding 
how and why firms configure and re-configure their entry modes should garner 
further insights on the process of entry mode selection.  
In addition, a plausible avenue for future research will be to explore the 
relationship between entry mode ownership level and entry mode diversity. When 
looking at the various entry modes chosen for different value chain activities in 
different host countries we may not only calculate various diversity measures but also 
refer to an “average” degree of ownership.  Entry mode configuration ownership can 
be thought of as the “mean” degree of ownership or internalization across a given 
firm’s value chain, where entry mode diversity can be thought of as the “variance” of 
such ownership degrees. Both the ownership and diversity of entry mode 
configurations are potentially important factors as they enhance our conceptualization 
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of foreign market entry modes from an ordinal categorical variable to a continuous 
variable which may be characterized by its mean and variance. Finally, there is much 
room to investigate the performance implications of entry mode diversity. Unravelling 
the relationship between entry mode diversity and performance is of utmost 
importance for better understanding the linkage between entry modes and 
performance.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper advances the vast literature on entry mode by introducing the 
concepts of entry mode diversity. By changing the unit of analysis from a single entry 
mode to multiple entry modes on geographical area level, business activity level, and 
corporate level we are able to enrich entry mode research design and investigate in 
more detail the parameters that affect the choice of certain levels of ownership and 
diversity. More specifically, when studying the factors affecting entry mode diversity 
we have two central findings: (1) We found that there are economies of scale leading 
to higher diversity levels for large firms; (2) We have identified a positive relationship 
between knowledge intensity and entry mode diversity, presumably indicating that 
highly knowledge intensive firms specialize in specific areas of expertise leading 
them to pursue multiple entry modes with multiple partners. 
These findings suggest that managers should consider their entry mode 
decisions by taking an overall view of their specific value chain activities and their 
worldwide dispersion rather than taking such decisions in isolation for each entry 
mode. Moreover, the design of an optimal entry mode configuration at the area, 
business activity and corporate level should be done by taking into account the effects 
of operations scale and knowledge intensity.  
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Figure 1 - Entry mode diversity matrix  
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Figure 2 – Scale of operations and marginal costs and benefits of entry mode diversity  
Diversity
Marginal costs/benefits 
of diversity
MC
MBhigh volume
MBlow volume
D0 D1
 34
  
 
Figure 3 – Knowledge intensity and marginal costs of entry mode diversity  
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Figure 4 – Knowledge intensity and marginal benefits of entry mode diversity  
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics and correlations (N=67) 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Area Diversity 1.72 0.80 -     
2. Business Activity Diversity 1.99 0.84 0.66** -    
3. Corporate Diversity 2.49 1.32 0.84** 0.83** -   
4. R&D Intensity 0.12 0.20 0.21* 0.22* 0.22* -  
5. Sales ($ US  thousands) 128,012 200,338 0.00 0.15 0.15 -0.17 - 
6. Scope of Foreign Operations 5.91 3.58 0.42** 0.41** 0.56** 0.14 0.34** 
* Significant at p=0.05 
** Significant at p=0.01 
 
 
Table 2 – Panel data regression analysis (dependent variable = Area diversity) 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Area 
Diversity 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
(OLS) 
Random Effects 
(GLS) 
VIF 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 4 
Knowledge 
Intensity 
1.15** 0.88** 1.42** 1.21** 1.23** 1.02** 2.17 
Size 0.22** 0.22** 0.37** 0.26** 0.27** 0.24** 2.20 
Knowledge 
Intensity×Size 
0.04 -0.07 -0.24 -0.17 -0.05 -0.11 1.30 
Scope of 
Foreign 
Operations 
 0.05*  0.08**  0.06* 1.86 
Establishment 
Year 
 0.01*  0.01**  0.01 1.51 
Metal  0.55  0.87**  0.67 1.29 
Rubber/Plastic  -0.07  0.18  0.03 1.36 
Textiles  0.37  0.67**  0.49 1.50 
Electronics  0.16  0.23*  0.19 1.30 
Telecom  0.01  0.00  0.01 1.26 
R2 0.22 0.31 0.86 0.87 0.25 0.33  
F 11.93** 5.52** 4.60** 51.13**    
Hausman m     3.12 -  
Breusch-
Pagan LM 
    26.60** 25.54**  
N 134 134 67 67 67 67  
Intercept, firm dummies (model 3), and residual firm-specific effects (model 4) suppressed. 
F-test reported for model 3 is a test of fixed effects, i.e. joint significance of the firm dummies. F-test 
for model 4 is test of entire model including independent variables and firm dummies. 
Time-invariant control variables explain 16% of firm-specific effect (model 4). 
Model 4 t-values deflated by 66 degrees of freedom to compensate for the three-stage approach. 
* Significant at p=0.05 
** Significant at p=0.01 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Panel data regression analysis (dependent variable = Business activity 
diversity) 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Business 
Activity  
Diversity 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
(OLS) 
Random Effects 
(GLS) 
VIF 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 4 
Knowledge 
Intensity 
1.20** 0.62* 1.33** 1.19** 1.26** 1.02** 2.24 
Size 0.11* 0.09 0.23* 0.16** 0.15* 0.24** 2.22 
Knowledge 
Intensity×Size 
0.01 -0.12 0.06 0.11 0.06 -0.11 1.33 
Scope of 
Foreign 
Operations 
 0.08**  0.05**  0.06* 1.87 
Establishment 
Year 
 0.01  0.01  0.01 1.51 
Metal  0.47  0.56*  0.67 1.28 
Rubber/Plastic  -0.06  -0.01  0.03 1.34 
Textiles  0.32  0.37  0.49 1.48 
Electronics  0.56**  0.47**  0.19 1.30 
Telecom  0.44  0.46*  0.01 1.26 
R2 0.18 0.35 0.82 0.82 0.17 0.33  
F 9.54** 6.56** 3.47** 34.95**    
Hausman m     2.23 -  
Breusch-
Pagan LM 
    19.86** 25.54**  
N 134 134 67 67 67 67  
Intercept, firm dummies (model 3), and residual firm-specific effects (model 4) suppressed. 
F-test reported for model 3 is a test of fixed effects, i.e. joint significance of the firm dummies. F-test 
for model 4 is test of entire model including independent variables and firm dummies. 
Time-invariant control variables explain 16% of firm-specific effect (model 4). 
Model 4 t-values deflated by 66 degrees of freedom to compensate for the three-stage approach. 
* Significant at p=0.05 
** Significant at p=0.01 
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Table 4 – Panel data regression analysis (dependent variable = Corporate diversity) 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Corporate 
Diversity 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
(OLS) 
Random Effects 
(GLS) 
VIF 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 4 
Knowledge 
Intensity 
1.95** 1.19** 2.52** 1.84** 2.12** 1.46** 2.19 
Size 0.35** 0.25* 0.70** 0.34** 0.46** 0.30** 2.21 
Knowledge 
Intensity×Size 
-0.04 -0.25 -0.50 -0.27 -0.14 0.22 1.29 
Scope of 
Foreign 
Operations 
 0.18**  0.27**  0.20** 1.96 
Establishment 
Year 
 0.01  0.00  0.01 1.51 
Metal  0.84  1.59**  1.11 1.30 
Rubber/Plastic  0.07**  0.65*  0.28 1.38 
Textiles  1.05**  1.73**  1.29** 1.53 
Electronics  0.49  0.72**  0.57 1.31 
Telecom  0.47  0.44  0.48 1.26 
R2 0.23 0.42 0.85 0.88 0.26 0.45  
F 12.59** 9.02** 3.88** 56.62**    
Hausman m     5.05 -  
Breusch-
Pagan LM 
    21.18** 20.54**  
N 134 134 67 67 67 67  
Intercept, firm dummies (model 3), and residual firm-specific effects (model 4) suppressed. 
F-test reported for model 3 is a test of fixed effects, i.e. joint significance of the firm dummies. F-test 
for model 4 is test of entire model including independent variables and firm dummies. 
Time-invariant control variables explain 26% of firm-specific effect (model 4). 
Model 4 t-values deflated by 66 degrees of freedom to compensate for the three-stage approach. 
* Significant at p=0.05 
** Significant at p=0.01 
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